FCC rules for backup power

Tue Nov 13 21:15:53 UTC 2007

What? The gov't putting their nose in where it shouldn't be? NEVER!

-Mike

On Nov 13, 2007 1:00 PM, Wayne E. Bouchard <web at typo.org> wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 13, 2007 at 03:07:03PM -0500, Sean Donelan wrote:
> >
> >
> > Proposed new FCC rules for backup power sources for central offices, cell
> > sites, remote switches, digital loops, etc.  For the first time, the FCC
> > is considering specific backup power time requirements of 24 hours for
> > central offices and 8 hours for outside plant and cell sites.  Although
> > most carriers tended to follow old Bell System Practices for backup power,
> > BSP's weren't official regulations.
> >
> > ISPs aren't specifically covered, but ....
> >
> > <http://www.tessco.com/yts/industry/products/infra/infrastructure/power_supplies/pdf/agl_reprint.pdf>
>
> I would suggest that these requirements will run afoul of local
> regulations regarding the storage of combustibles such as diesel fuel
> or other hazardous materials. (Think 111 8th ave and 9/11) This
> article seems to take much the same position.
>
> In short, this, to me, is the FCC putting it's nose where it doesn't
> belong. This is not something which should be regulated by this
> agency, it should be something done by the various communications
> operators in conjuntion with local municipalities. Yes, this means
> that there will be variances in many places but the regulations in
> place regarding fuel storage and so forth (no to mention batteries for
> DC plants, FM200 storage, etc, etc) are there because they are deemed
> to be in the best interests of the local community. The FCC has no
> idea what those "best interests" are and never will.
>
> Besides, when you're talking about a Katrina sized event, 24 hours is
> meaningless. Normal communications were not restored on many areas of
> the region (not just Louisiana) for days or weeks afterwards. And the
> assessment of what had occured didn't really begin until after the 24
> hour mark was over anyway. The NTSB learned from its process of
> grounding planes after 9/11 that there are some emergency events where
> having pre-existing procedures in place can actually be harmful. The
> determination was that if there had been a process defined, all it
> would have done is slow things down by restricting what controllers
> could and could not do. Better to just let them use their knowledge
> and experience and act in the best way they know how, given the
> situation before them.
>
> Lets also point out that a generator is most often going to be outside
> the building at ground level, wether or not it is contained within its
> own structure. And if the generator isn't, there's a fair chance it's
> fuel tank would be. Not everyone will be willing to deal with the
> expense of burying it. As such, these are usually totally exposed to
> the elements and any lowland flooding. Meaning that if something fails
> in a facility due to a weather related event, it's probably going to
> be the generator. We've all seen that many times before.
>
> My $0.37
>
> -Wayne
>
> ---
> Wayne Bouchard
> web at typo.org
> Network Dude
> http://www.typo.org/~web/
>