On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names
frnkblk at iname.com
Sat Mar 31 16:09:15 UTC 2007
What about a worldwide clearing house where all registrars must submit their
domains for some basic verification?
Naming: For phishing reasons. I think detection of possible trademark
violations would be too contentious.
Contact info: It's fine to use a proxy to hide true ownership to the public,
but the clearing house would verify telephone numbers and addresses against
public and private databases, and for those countries that don't have that
well built-out, something that ties payment (whether that be credit card,
bank transfer, or check) to a piece of identification as strong as a
Funding of such a clearing house: a flat fee per domain
Maintenance: It can't be a one-time event, but I'm not sure how this would
Of course, the above is only utopia and the problem has to get much worse
before we'll see international cooperation.
From: owner-nanog at merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog at merit.edu] On Behalf Of
Sent: Saturday, March 31, 2007 9:47 AM
To: Gadi Evron
Cc: nanog at merit.edu
Subject: Re: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names
On Sat, 2007-03-31 at 06:16 -0500, Gadi Evron wrote:
> Or we can look at it from a different perspective:
> Should bad guys be able to register thousands of domains with "amazon" and
> "paypal" in them every day? Should there be black hat malicious registrars
> around? Shouldn't there be an abuse route for domain names?
> One problem at a time, please.
Based on Lorenzen's data, domain tasting enables millions of domain
names to be in flux every day. Exchange lists this large to end users
is extremely costly. When small handguns became a weapon of choice for
holdups, a waiting period was imposed to allow enforcement agencies time
to block exchanges.
Even when bad actors can be identified, a reporting lag of 12 to 24
hours in the case of global registries ensures there can be no
preemptive response. If enforcement at this level is to prevent crime,
registries would need to help by providing some advanced notice.
Perhaps all registries should be required to report public details of
domain name additions 24 hours in advance of the same details being
published in the TLD zones.
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