Security gain from NAT (was: Re: Cool IPv6 Stuff)
bonomi at mail.r-bonomi.com
Mon Jun 4 19:45:27 UTC 2007
> From owner-nanog at merit.edu Mon Jun 4 13:54:55 2007
> Subject: Re: Security gain from NAT (was: Re: Cool IPv6 Stuff)
> Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2007 14:47:06 -0400
> On 4-Jun-2007, at 14:32, Jim Shankland wrote:
> > Shall I do the experiment again where I set up a Linux box
> > at an RFC1918 address, behind a NAT device, publish the root
> > password of the Linux box and its RFC1918 address, and invite
> > all comers to prove me wrong by showing evidence that they've
> > successfully logged into the Linux box?
> Perhaps you should run a corresponding experiment whereby you set up
> a linux box with a globally-unique address, put it behind a firewall
> which blocks all incoming traffic to that box, and issue a similar
> Do you think the results will be different?
Consider the possible *FAILURE* modes.
e.g. (1) where somebody brings up _another_ path between the LAN that that
box is onn, and the public internet, with no translations or other
(2) where the 'protection box' "fails open" -- e.g. passes all traffic
NAT/PAT is 'belt and suspenders', but it *does* provide an additional layer of
That 'additional protection' may or may not be 'significant', depending on
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