Abuse procedures... Reality Checks

Wed Apr 11 17:32:20 UTC 2007

On Apr 11, 2007, at 11:28 AM, J. Oquendo wrote:

> Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu wrote:
>> * PGP Signed by an unverified key: 04/11/07 at 11:21:15
>>
>> On Wed, 11 Apr 2007 07:07:19 EDT, "J. Oquendo" said:
>>
>>> these so called rules? Many network operators are required to
>>> do a lot of things, one of these things should be the
>>> mitigation of malicious traffic from LEAVING their network.
>>>
>>
>> And I want a pony.
>>
>> We don't even do a (near) universal job of filtering rfc1918  
>> addresses
>> and spoofed addresses.  We aren't filtering obvious bogon packets,  
>> how
>> do you propose we filter less obvious malicious traffic (is that SYN
>> packet legit, or part of a DDOS, or just a slashdotting of a suddenly
>> popular site?).
>>
>>
>> * Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks at vt.edu>
>> * 0xB4D3D7B0 - Unverified
>>
> When you say we, speak for yourself and your own networks.
> There ARE some
> people who do take the time to properly design their networks.

And I would suggest that Valdis is one of them....

 From my reading of his message I understood that:
A: Some people filter bad stuff.
B: Some people don't.

I don't think that it is unreasonable that he used "we " to include  
all network engineers -- "we" as a community does include A and B

> It is the
> same "Well since Billy didn't do it neither will I" attitude that  
> makes
> me never think twice about blocking CIDR's.

So, I have always wondered -- how do you customers really react when  
they can no longer reach www.example.com, a site hosted a few IPs  
away from www.badevilphisher.net? And do you really think that you  
blocking them is going to make example.com contact their provider to  
get things fixed?

>
> Since 'THEY' (your "WE") didn't properly configure their network, why
> should I think twice about letting it into my backyard. I guess its  
> calling
> for too much for network operators to actually do their work though

Have you considered that being a little politer and not insulting  
everyone on the list might be a more constructive way of getting your  
point across -- if I were to call you a "big, fat, doodoo head" you  
would probably be less receptive than if I didn't...

> and I
> guess considering IPv6 is like how many years away now, I can  
> expect that
> much of a wait for people to implement what should have been done  
> from the
> onset.
>
> I don't care how filtering gets done from someone else. Like I said  
> if I
> can watch and control what comes out of my networks using raw tools on
> nix machines, you cannot with a straight face/typing method tell me  
> that
> someone at one of these big providers can't clue themselves in to  
> getting
> malicious traffic controlled.
>
> Should someone want to comment about "oh golly the cost is outrageous"
> I say bs... Its utter laziness from my eyes. So here I go politely
> pointing it out... If I can do it with a couple of thousand  
> machines on
> my VERY OWN, not a "team", not a "department" but me, in a matter of
> minutes, situate my network to not send out crap, then why can't these
> companies?

Yes, it is great that you are doing your bit to help keep the net  
clean. Congratulations and thank you. Perhaps you could write a nice,  
simple, friendly guide explaining how you ensure that your network is  
never the source of malicious traffic?  And how this can be scaled up  
to work in a large, backbone network where? Perhaps you could  
politely contact those who are not doing their bit and, in a helpful  
manner explain how they could improve -- educating and encouraging  
change in those who are not doing their bit is much more likely to  
make things better than screaming "You suck, I'm not going to accept  
your packets, nah nah nah."

> I'd like to here something logical, not someone's opinion.
> Something like "According to ARIN/IEEE specifications of foobarfoo,
> operators are not allowed to view traffic entering or leaving their
> networks" which hinders this. There is no reason I could think of,
> no scenario I could imagine, that would prohibit network operators
> from putting the nail in the coffin with stuff LEAVING THEIR NETS.
>
> Note the word LEAVING now. If it doesn't leave, you wouldn't have
> complaints from some other operator now would you.
>
>
>
> -- 
> ====================================================
> J. Oquendo
> http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x1383A743
> sil . infiltrated @ net http://www.infiltrated.net
> The happiness of society is the end of government.
> John Adams
>

I suspect that I should have just stayed out of this thread....
W
--
"Go on, prove me wrong. Destroy the fabric of the universe. See if I  
care."  -- Terry Prachett