On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names

Tue Apr 3 02:53:19 UTC 2007

> From: David Conrad <drc at virtualized.org>
> Subject: Re: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names
> Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2007 17:33:08 -0700
>
>
> On Apr 2, 2007, at 4:56 PM, Douglas Otis wrote:
> > The recommendation was for registries to provide a preview of the  
> > next day's zone.
>
> I think this might be a bit in conflict with efforts registries have  
> to reduce the turnaround in zone modification to the order of tens of  
> minutes.

This is getting far afield from 'network operations', but the underlying
issue is really quite simple:  There are *NO*PENALTIES* for registering
'bogus' domains.  The registry operator has -no- (financial) incentive
to investigate, nor remove, a 'falsified' entry.  Once a name is in the 
database, _anything_ affecting it is an 'un-necessary expense' to the registry 
operator.  

Similarly, there is no dis-incentive to a registrar wih regard to _filing_ a 
bogus registration with a registry.

Address _these_ issues, and the domain names "problem" will effectively 
disappear.

One _possible_ approach to dealing with the problem:
   1) registry includes in it's contract with registrars a (non-trivial) $$ 
      penalty for any registration filed that is found to contain invalid 
      information.
   2) 'formal complaints' to registrar about invalid information must include
      a 'filing fee' for the complaint.  If the complaint is in-accurate, the
      filer loses  their filing fee. HOWEVER, if the complaint _is_ valid, the
      _original_ filer gets back _more_ than their fee (paid out of the 'fine',
      see item 1, above, assessed against the registrar) while any additional
      complainants get all their original money returned.  Possible variation:
      the size of the fine assessed against the registrar for a 'confirmed'
      complaint depends on the number of complaints recieved within some 
      'reasonable' time of the first complaint -- and all complaints within
      that 'window' get the 'bounty' for a valid compliant.
   3) Registrars are charged a _sliding-scale_ of fees, with higher fees based
      on the numbers and/or percentages of 'bogus' registrations submitted
      recently. (This is similar to the way 'unemployment taxes' are assessed
      in the U.S.  If there are more claims against your company, you pay
      a higher rate than similar firms with lower claims.)
   4) Registrars with higher rates of 'invalid' submissions are _rate-limited_
      as to how fast they can submit registrations.

Underlying assumptions:
   A) The 'filing fee' approximates the registry operator cost of performing a 
      basic investigation.
   B) The 'fine' assessed against a registrar is signficantly higher than the 
      actual 'cost' of the investigation.
   C) A registrar that has higher per-registration costs is at a competitive
      disadvantage to those who canprovide equivalent service at a lower price.
   D) A registrar who has to say "We'll take your application now, but we can't
      tell you for xx hours (or days) if your application for that name was
      successful" is  at a competitive disadvantage to one who can tell you
      _now_ 'your application was successful'.

*THIS* gives the registry operator an incentive to 'clean house' -- finding
and eliminating 'problem listings' is a REVENUE SOURCE.

Similarly, registrars have an incentive to ensure that their _own_ house is
clean.  Lack of diligence costs them extra money, -and- places them at a
disadvantage relative to their competition.

'White-hat' registrars can do something similar with regard to registrants.
Registrants fall into three broad categories;  (a) those who have never
filed before, (b) those who _do_ have a history of problem-free filings,
and (c) those who have a history of filings where there have been some 
problems.  

Those with a 'no problems' history are processed in an expedited manner,
suject to checks for 'abnormal' behavior -- e.g. a radical increase in
the number/rate of submissions.

Those with no histories are subjected to additional cross-checking/verification,
and, possibly, higher 'new user' charges.

Those with 'problematic' histories get deferred, surcharged, and/or rate-
limited processing.

One can 'tune' the rate schedules for 'new users', and 'problematic' filers,
to reflect the "risk level" that the registrar is willing to incur, -with-
the recogition that registrar-level penalties imposed by a registry operator
will affect _all_ registrations through that registrar, not just 'problematic'
ones.

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