fyi-- [dns-operations] early key rollover for dlv.isc.org

Gregory Hicks ghicks at cadence.com
Sat Sep 23 00:01:31 UTC 2006


> Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2006 19:55:39 -0400
> From: Joseph S D Yao <jsdy at center.osis.gov>
> To: Fergie <fergdawg at netzero.net>
> Cc: nanog at merit.edu
> Subject: Re: fyi-- [dns-operations] early key rollover for dlv.isc.org
> 
> 
> On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 11:39:51PM +0000, Fergie wrote:
> > Hmmm. It wouldn't have anything to do with prime numbers, now would
> > it? :-)
> 
> 
> Well, yes, but there are an infinite number of them.
> 
> Of course, 17 is the most prime of them all.

isc.org announced the early key rollover just as a discussion about
"exponent 3 damage spreads" on the cryptography list was heating up.

This discussion started with a statement that:

> I've just noticed that BIND is vulnerable to:
>
> http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20060905.txt
>
> Executive summary:
>
> RRSIGs can be forged if your RSA key has exponent 3, which is BIND's
> default. Note that the issue is in the resolver, not the server.
>
> Fix:
>
> Upgrade OpenSSL.

So I thought that the early key rollover was due to this.  Yet it seems
to me that this discussion is still recommending that "-e 3" be used.

Regards,
GRegory hicks
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