Collocation Access Control

Gadi Evron ge at
Tue Oct 24 07:43:32 UTC 2006

On Mon, 23 Oct 2006, Alex Rubenstein wrote:
> > (They let me in eventually with a passport. But if they're going to  
> > trust a foreign-issued passport as photo id, it's not really that  
> > obvious to me why they wouldn't trust a foreign-issued driving  
> > licence. It's not like they can really tell whether either of them  
> > are forged.)
> What I've never understood is, that, how a gov't issue ID (for the
> purposes of allowing entry) is of any use whatsoever.
> It's not as if someone is doing a instand background check to know if
> the person is a criminal, or wanted, or whatever. It's trivial to forge
> a gov't ID.

I see the frustration, but not the problem.

1. Verify with your supplier that they are sending somebody.
2. Get names and other identifying details to your satisfaction.
3. And this is the tricky part - identify them.

There are many solutions for #3 to happen. Any badge-based security system
can be broken with 5 minutes worth of operational intelligence
gathering, if you are that much of a target for someone to care.

All you need is to actually have security with a beurocratic system for
admitting people and enforcing others don't get in, and then work it out
with your supplier/whoever else you want to let in.

Once you identify them, depending on your concerns, make sure they are
escorted through-out their stay or just let them roam.

I think that although your concerns are justified, they are msiplaced with
AT&T, they should be with your own security, if it is of importance -
which may not be the case.


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