register.com down sev0?
Michael.Dillon at btradianz.com
Michael.Dillon at btradianz.com
Fri Oct 27 09:54:49 UTC 2006
> but i am not foolish enough to believe
> that religious ranting on mailing lists is gonna change anyone from
> doing what makes business sense for their network.
And it is not going to change the minds of the
majority of network operations folks who are not
on the NANOG list nor the majority of telecoms
executives who are also not on the NANOG list.
Back in the old days, the NANOG list did hold the
majority of Internet operations folks so new ideas
like flap dampening were able to spread quickly.
But those days are long gone. NANOG still has an
important educational role but it is no longer based
on being part of the old boys club and knowing the
secret handshake. In other words, there is no cohesive
society of network operators which can be swayed
by attempts at social engineering like shaming or
BCP 38 has had its day. Nowadays, it is more important
to look at how to mitigate current DDoS techniques and
to describe the larger problem and look for larger
solutions. However, any attempt at larger solutions
require a large amount of humility because nobody
can say for sure, what will work and what won't.
The fact remains that there is not a good technical
method for mitigating large scale distributed DDoS
that results in LARGE TRAFFIC FLOWS ENTERING A NETWORK
FROM ALL PEERED ASES SIMULTANEOUSLY.
Perhaps if we could find a way to allow the attacked
AS to set ACLs automatically in all the source AS
networks, that would help mitigate these attacks.
For instance, consider a set of ASes which all install
an ACL-setter box. These boxes all trust each other to
send-receive ACL setting requests through a trusted channel.
The owner of a box sets some limits on the ACLs that can
be set, for instance n ACLs per AS, max ACL lifetime, etc.
And the box owner also decides the subset of their routers
which will accept an ACL for a given address range.
Then when an attack comes in, the victim AS uses some tool
to identify large sources, i.e. a CIDR block that covers
some significant percentage of the source addresses in
one AS. They then issue an ACL request to that AS to block
the flow and the ACL takes effect almost instantaneously with
no human intervention.
Yes, this can result in some IP addresses being blocked
unfairly, but the DDoS traffic levels often have the same
impact. In any case, the AS holding the destination address
is the one doing the blocking even though the mechanism
is an ACL inside the source AS network.
On the technical side, it is not a complex problem to put
such a system in place. The complexity is largely in getting
network operators to come to an agreement on the terms
under which operator A will allow operator B to set ACLs
in operator A's network. Until network operators see DDoS
as a significant business problem, this will not happen.
Note that a "business problem" does not refer solely to
the direct costs of mitigating a DDoS attack. It also includes
the indirect fallout which is harder to measure such as
loss of goodwill, missed opportunities, etc.
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