private ip addresses from ISP
bonomi at mail.r-bonomi.com
Tue May 23 13:22:09 UTC 2006
> Date: Tue, 23 May 2006 03:33:34 -0400
> From: Richard A Steenbergen <ras at e-gerbil.net>
> To: nanog at nanog.org
> Subject: Re: private ip addresses from ISP
> On Mon, May 22, 2006 at 04:30:37PM -0400, Andrew Kirch wrote:
> > > 3) You are seeing packets with source IPs inside private space
> > > arriving at
> > > your interface from your ISP?
> > Sorry to dig this up from last week but I have to strongly disagree with
> > point #3.
> > >From RFC 1918
> > Because private addresses have no global meaning, routing information
> > about private networks shall not be propagated on inter-enterprise
> > links, and packets with private source or destination addresses
> > should not be forwarded across such links. Routers in networks not
> > using private address space, especially those of Internet service
> > providers, are expected to be configured to reject (filter out)
> > routing information about private networks.
> > The ISP shouldn't be "leaving" anything to the end-user, these packets
> > should be dropped as a matter of course, along with any routing
> > advertisements for RFC 1918 space(From #1). ISP's who leak 1918 space
> > into my network piss me off, and get irate phone calls for their
> > trouble.
> The section you quoted from RFC1918 specifically addresses routes, not
I quote, from the material cited above:
" ..., and packets with private source or destination addresses
should not be forwarded across such links. ... "
There are some types of packets that can legitimately have RFC1918 source
addresses -- 'TTL exceeded' for example -- that one should legitimately
allow across network boundaries.
> If you're receiving RFC1918 *routes* from anyone, you need to
> thwack them over the head with a cluebat a couple of times until the cluey
> filling oozes out. If you're receiving RFC1918 sourced packets, for the
> most part you really shouldn't care.
When those packets contain 'malicious' content, for example.
When the provider =cannot= tell me which of _their_own_customers_ originated
that attack, for example. (This provider has inbound source-filtering on
their Internet 'gateway' routers, but *not* on their customer-facing equipment
(either inbound or outbound.)
It's even more comical when the NSP uses RFC1918 space internally, and does
*not* filter those source addresses from their customers.
> There are semi-legitimate reasons for
> packets with those sources addresses to float around the Internet, and
> they don't hurt anything.
I guess you don't mind paying for transit of packets that _cannot_possibly_
have any legitimate purpose on your network.
Some of us, on the other hand, _do_ object.
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