So -- what did happen to Panix?

Todd Underwood todd-nanog at renesys.com
Fri Jan 27 15:32:42 UTC 2006


randy, all,

On Fri, Jan 27, 2006 at 04:36:28AM -0800, Randy Bush wrote:
> 
> > what I saw by going through the diffs, etc.. that I have
> > available to me is that the prefix was registered to be announced
> > by our customer and hence made it into our automatic IRR filters.
> 
> i.e., the 'error' was intended, and followed all process.

yep.  that's the depressing part.  

> so, what i don't see is how any hacks on routing, such as delay,
> history, ... will prevent this while not, at the same time, have
> very undesired effects on those legitimately changing isps.

you're probably right (as usual).  but it seems that if you delay
acceptance of announcements with novel origination patterns, you don't
harm very many legitimate uses.  in particular, ASes changing
upstreams won't be harmed at all.  people moving their prefix to a new
ISP will have a fixed delay in getting their announcement propagated,
sure.  but they already have this delay now.  

they tell the new ISP:  'announce my prefix' and the new ISP says
'prove it's yours'.  they do that for a couple of emails.  then the
new ISP asks it's upstreams to accept that announcement.  that takes a
little while (ranging from 4 to 72 hours in my recent experience).

> seems to me that certified validation of prefix ownership and as
> path are the only real way out of these problems that does not
> teach us the 42 reasons we use a *dynamic* protocol.

certified validation of prefix ownership (and path, as has been
pointed out) would be great.  it's clearly a laudable goal and seemed
like the right way to go.  but right now, no one is doing it.  the
rfcs that's i've found have all expired.  and the conversation about
it has reached the point where people seem to have stopped even
disagreeing about how to do it.  in short, it's as dead as dns-sec.
so what are we do do in the meantime?

t.

-- 
_____________________________________________________________________
todd underwood
chief of operations & security 
renesys - internet intelligence
todd at renesys.com   www.renesys.com



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