So -- what did happen to Panix?

Michael.Dillon at Michael.Dillon at
Mon Feb 6 09:43:57 UTC 2006

> Other networks have no such incentive, since their transit providers 
> and peers either build their filters in other ways, or don't filter 
> at all.

There is nothing wrong with building your filter in
some other way, however, that does not mean that you
cannot validate your filters against the IRR and take
some action on mismatches. For instance you could email
the prefix owners about the mismatch and ask them to
update the IRR.

> Wherever there is a lack of incentive to keep records accurate, we 
> can probably safely assume that they are either missing or stale.

Yes. Without regular validation or auditing of data,
it does not stay up to date.

> It's probably fair to say that if all the large, default-free 
> carriers insisted that their customers submitted their routes to the 
> IRR, then every route would be registered. This would not completely 
> address the problem of stale data, though.

It's a good start. Perhaps if we decouple the idea of an IRR
from "building filters" more people will see the usefulness
of a distributed repository of information against which
they can validate (cryptographically or otherwise) their
routing data.

Right now the secure BGP protocols require a network to
climb the hurdles of cryptographic certification in order
to participate. A revised and renewed IRR can lower that
barrier so that people can participate even before they
implement cryptographic signing and certification.

> The IRR is a loosely-connected collection of route registries, all 
> run by different people. Data originating in one database is 
> frequently found to be mirrored in other databases, but not in any 
> great systematic fashion.

If the networking community can't solve the problem
of managing the distributed route registries in a systematic
fashion, then how can it implement one of the secure BGP proposals?

--Michael Dillon

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