Malicious DNS request?

Thu May 12 15:26:48 UTC 2005

On Thu, 12 May 2005 16:43:07 +0200, Brad Knowles said:
> At 12:41 PM +0400 2005-05-12, Gadi Evron quoted Joe Shen:
> >  I'd suggest dropping requests for domains you don't hold.
> 	That's kind of hard to do if you're running a recursive/caching nameserver.

Well.. are you running a recursive/caching nameserver for everybody on the
internet to use, or only for your customers?  If the request isn't from
inside your address space, and it's a "recursion requested" for a zone you
don't hold, maybe they're asking the wrong DNS server.

(And yes, I know that if you have a roaming user who's outside your address
space but has hard-coded your DNS IP's in their resolv.conf, it gets trickier.
The right answer here depends on your customer base.)

It's often suggested that you have *two* DNS setups - one that only answers
requests from inside for recursion and caching, and an authoritative one that
faces out and refuses to recurse.  The inside one will cache the outside one
fast enough in most environments.  (No, this doesn't stop all the possible DNS
malfeasance, but it certainly raises the bar a good chunk...)

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 226 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/attachments/20050512/9a8d1aa6/attachment.sig>