DOS attack tracing

Scott Weeks surfer at mauigateway.com
Tue May 10 03:43:01 UTC 2005


On Mon, 9 May 2005, Steve Gibbard wrote:
: On Mon, 9 May 2005, Scott Weeks wrote:
: > On Mon, 9 May 2005, Richard wrote:
: >
: > : type of routers. Our routers normally run at 35% CPU. What sucks is that the
: > : traffic volume doesn't have to be very high to bring down the router.
: >
: > That's because it's the number of packets per time period that it can't
: > handle, not the traffic level.  At this point it seems most likely that
: > it's a simple UDP flood.  If your CPU usually runs at 35% you definitely
: > don't need a bigger router unless you're expecting a growth spurt.  You
: > might want to put an RRDTool or MRTG graph on the CPU usage to be sure.
:
: I'll disagree here.

Cool!  Good 'ol operations discussion...  :-)


I took things out of order from your email, but kept the context.

: www.stevegibbard.com/ddos-talk.htm

Nice paper.   However, you still say what I was saying, just in a
different sort of way.  Instead of NTop and RRDTool/MRTG, you use Cricket.
RRDTool/MRTG alerts you to the problem and NTop directs you to the source
of the problem.  Once you get the procedure down pat, it can go pretty
fast.

As far as puttimg something in front of the core router(s) (such as
Riverhead), I assumed there was nothing there for Richard; just raw
router interface(s) to the upstream and not enough budget to afford those
nice-but-expensive boxes.  I was going to mention things like Riverhead or
Packeteer later in the posts if appropriate.


: When you're engineering a network, what you generally need to care about
: is peak traffic, not average traffic.  While DOS attack traffic is
: presumably traffic you'd rather not have, it tends to be part of the
: environment.
:
: This is somewhat of an arms race, and no router will protect you from all
: conceivable DOS attacks.  That said, designing your network around the
: size of attack you typically see (plus some room for growth) raises the
: bar, and turns attacks of the size you've designed for into non-events
: that you don't need to wake up in the middle of the night for.

This is what I was getting at.  Engineering the network.  That's more
than buying a Bigger Badder Router and Fatter Pipes(BBR&FP).  If your
router is running at 35% during the normal peak traffic flow, you don't
need a BBR&FP.  All you need to do is design the network (and train the
monkeys, as randy terms it... :-) to deal with extraordinary peaks.


: Remember, the real goal in dealing with DOS attacks is to get to the point
: where you don't notice them, rather than just being able to explain why
: your network is down.

Yes, but a BBR&FP isn't the way to deal with this unless you've got the
big budget.  I know that a bigger hammer is better if you've got the
money, but if you don't engineering finesse can work well.

scott




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