The entire mechanism is Wrong!
jmaimon at ttec.com
Sun Jan 16 16:01:59 UTC 2005
Eric Brunner-Williams in Portland Maine wrote:
>Gentlemen and Ladies,
>I concur with the view expressed by Bob Fox (IANA-134), that the
>"current method only favours Verisign and crooks."
>The hijacking of panix.com, and the post-hijacking response of VGRS,
>which could unilaterally act, but choses not to, for its own reasons,
>and MelburneIT, which could unilaterally act, but choses to not act
>until 72 hours after being noticed, if then, is a counter-example to
>any claim that the current method has any rational application to
>domain names that are "mission critical", that is, used for something
>other than proping up some shoddy trademark claim by some party that
>doesn't even use the dns for core operational practice.
>It doesn't reflect very well on the registries and registrars either.
>CTO Wampumpeag, LLC
>Operator, USA Webhost, IANA-439, CORE-124
Do you mean by that the "No-Hijack" bit be set by default?
Or perhaps do you mean previous owners can call in a "stop order" or
"dispute" the transfer unilaterally within X days of occurence, much
like it works for many REAL money transactions?
How are trademark domains relevant to panix.com?
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