The entire mechanism is Wrong!

Sun Jan 16 11:47:46 UTC 2005

Gentlemen and Ladies,

I concur with the view expressed by Bob Fox (IANA-134), that the
"current method only favours Verisign and crooks."

The hijacking of panix.com, and the post-hijacking response of VGRS,
which could unilaterally act, but choses not to, for its own reasons,
and MelburneIT, which could unilaterally act, but choses to not act
until 72 hours after being noticed, if then, is a counter-example to
any claim that the current method has any rational application to
domain names that are "mission critical", that is, used for something
other than proping up some shoddy trademark claim by some party that
doesn't even use the dns for core operational practice.

It doesn't reflect very well on the registries and registrars either.

Eric Brunner-Williams
CTO Wampumpeag, LLC
Operator, USA Webhost, IANA-439, CORE-124