Speaking of viruses...

Adam Maloney adam at whee.org
Thu Feb 10 20:08:34 UTC 2005


I sent this to CERT this morning.  They apparently were unaware of it, and 
as far as I can tell there's nothing on any of the A/V sites about it.  As 
of 14:00 CST, these sites are still serving up the virus executable.  I 
haven't heard anything back from CERT or UCLA.  Am I the only one seeing 
this?!

>From adam at whee.org Thu Feb 10 10:24:16 2005
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2005 10:24:15 -0600 (CST)
From: Adam Maloney <adam at whee.org>
To: cert at cert.org
Cc: abuse at ucla.edu
Subject: Attn: Bob - Dust.exe

CC'd to abuse at ucla.edu - UCLA, your option "2" for your abuse desk rings to an 
invalid number.

On Monday morning a bunch of our Win2k PC's got infected with a virus. We are 
seeing the infected machines attempting to make FTP connections to various IP's 
- the one's I've seen so far are in UCLA and MIT address space.  The client 
connects to the FTP server (all have been Serv-U running under Windows), logs 
in with username "1", password "1", and retrieves Dust.exe

Some of the IP's I've seen connections to:
18.242.5.42 (MIT)
18.241.5.89 (MIT)
169.232.117.223 (UCLA)

The Dust.exe process attempts to install infected files named Jah.exe and 
Gamma.exe  Jah is detected by Trend as WORM_RBOT.alo  Gamma is detected as 
"possible virus".

Starting this morning Trend started detecting Dust as TROJ_SCNDTHOT.ab
When the machine tried to download it from MIT, Trend caught it as above. When 
it tried to UCLA, Trend did not catch it, and the download succeeded.

When this hit on Monday, we saw infected PC's trying to infect other 
machines over tcp/445.  They were trying random IP's in the address space 
that the infected computer was configured in.  We did not see any FTP 
connections Monday morning like these, however we weren't really looking 
for them.

-- END --

After this was sent, I've found some more details.  The Dust.exe file is 
also being served by IP's at ThePlanet and ncsd.edu.  The file from UCLA 
is about 5K bigger than the files served by the other sites.  This 
explains why Trend was catching it when served by MIT but not by UCLA.

After some more investigation, it looks like an infected machine uses a 
tcp/445 vulnerability to infect others.  Once the others are hit on 445, 
they are instructed to download the payload from these FTP sites.

I've made copies of the files available to CERT.  I'm waiting on Trend to 
react to our support request from this morning.



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