"Cisco gate" - Payload Versus Vector

Jim Popovitch jimpop at yahoo.com
Tue Aug 2 22:46:09 UTC 2005


On Tue, 2005-08-02 at 15:29 -0700, Dan Hollis wrote:
> On Tue, 2 Aug 2005, Randy Bush wrote:
> > even without stiffling the heap check via crashing_already (i.e. a
> > 'fix' is developed for that weakness), is the 30-60 second window
> > sufficient to do serious operational damage.  i.e. what could an
> > attacker do with a code injection with a mean life as short as
> > 15-30 seconds?
> 
> change the passwords and write to nvram, and come back later?

some more that come to mind as ssh/enable pw changes wouldn't go
unnoticed for too long.

change snmptrap dest
change snmp r/w comstrs (most monitoring would only use r/o comstrs)
change ACLs on snmp access to allow public IPs
change the ip address of the host that is used for tftp boots

lots of things can be done in a 1/10 of the 30-60 second window.

-Jim P.






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