Sinkhole Architecture

Fri Apr 29 13:34:19 UTC 2005

On Fri, 29 Apr 2005, Howard C. Berkowitz wrote:

>
> I've seen some Cisco security presentations that include sinkholes
> composed of an ingress and egress router, interconnected with a
> switch. The switch provides access for tools such as packet
> analyzers, IDS, routing analyzers, etc. The multiple routers also
> provide more horsepower for inspection, filtering, and
> overhead-imposing measurements such as NetFlow.

the multiple routers could just be a way to get a MAC to the ingress
router for delivery over the ethernet... a sun/linux/bsd/*unix box might
provide the same function. (please logging, analysis, ids, flow
collection)

>
> I am unclear about the BGP relationship between the two routers,
> which are meant to be treated as one subsystem.  The ingress router
> (with respect to the outside) clearly has to have its BGP isolated
> from the rest of the AS, so it can't be part of the iBGP mesh.
>

why can't it be part of the ibgp mesh? I'm not sure I see why that would
be BAD, aside from it bouncing under load and affecting all ibgp
neighbors... so, aside from route-churn and neighbor setup/teardown churn
what other reasons?