short Botnet list and Cashing in on DoS
jtk at northwestern.edu
Fri Oct 22 20:26:19 UTC 2004
On Wed, 20 Oct 2004 15:14:29 -0400
"Hannigan, Martin" <hannigan at verisign.com> wrote:
> [..]we additionally request that they resolve the RR to 127.0.0.3
> before they lock out and reload the zone.
> We picked 127/8 as the standard. RFC 1918 wasn't suitable
> for obvious reasons.
[ I know you know this Martin, but for some list subscribers... ]
As I briefly mentioned in the presentation, 127/8 addresses can be
problematic also. 127.0.0.3 is better than 127.0.0.1, but there are
some cases where a self-inflicted reflection attack can occur. Take
for example what happened to some organizations when Blaster struck.
Some organizations changed their local recursive DNS servers so that
they were authorative for the windowsupdate record and then pointed
it to 127.0.0.1. When the Blaster clock struck midnight (so to speak),
the attack against that name did not reach Microsoft, but it did tend
to result in odd-looking TCP RST packets on the local network.
When the worm attacked the resolved name, it attacked 127.0.0.1, which
would normally sound fine, but the worm did so using spoofed source
addresses. Most infected hosts not having a process on the attacked
port (TCP port 80), would issue a TCP reset to the spoofed source.
Arguably a dumb thing for a system to do, but regardless it would
happily send responses onto the wire to the spoofed address using
a source address of 127.0.0.1. A number of admins then began wondering
why they were seeing all these RSTs from a loopback address on their
Hopefully anti-spoofing knobs were enabled and they didn't get far,
but even on some local segments that might have caused a noticeable
Interestly some systems will respond to certain types of packets to
any local address. So even using something besides 127.0.0.1 may
result in this odd reflection behavior. My guess is that it isn't
that big a deal since it should be localized as far as anti-spoofing
knobs are enabled.
I kind of like the idea of using 240/4 for closing names especially
since many network operators I suspect are more likely to notice (and
hopefully do the host mitigation) when hosts send to bogons rather than
when hosts are doing DNS queries that result in bogon answers (even if
hosts are querying excessively for them). I may be wrong, but I tend
to think 240/4 is in less likely to be in use than any of the other
reserved or special use space.
In another somewhat related session about DNS issues, when it was
suggested that a well known address be used to close with, someone
at the mic suggested that using well known addresses for this purpose
may not be good practice. I think they were referring in part to Dave
Plonka's draft about embedding globally routable addresses in hardware,
which I don't think applies in this case, but maybe I missed something.
Their argument may be worthwhile to consider for other reasons.
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