size of the routing table is a big deal, especially in IPv6

Tue Nov 30 08:17:54 UTC 2004

On Tue, 2004-11-30 at 10:01 +0200, Hank Nussbacher wrote:
> At 08:14 PM 29-11-04 -0800, Tony Li wrote:
<SNIP>
> >My preferred solution at this point is for the UN to take over management 
> >of the entire Internet and for them to issue a policy of one prefix per 
> >country.

> <SNIP>
> If the customer doesn't mend their ways, then the RIR should be 
> free to start announcing that IP block and static route it to some RIR 
> blackhole.  That would definitely get the attention of the wayward 
> ISP/customer.  Of course all this would have to be backed up by IAB+IETF as 
> well, but I think we should learn to police ourselves before we ask for the 
> UN/ITU to do it for us.

Announcing a blackhole by a RIR, does that mean when someone hijacks
a /20 either IPv4 or IPv6, the RIR will blackhole all the more
specifics? :)

Would it not be better to have a *GLOBAL* "Good Prefixes" list then and
of course ones private list that adds some other prefixes that you would
like to see, combined filter on those. Depending on RADB or other
routing databases does help a bit too btw.

In other words, we will have to either extend BGP a lot or we have to
come up with a new protocol to do so. "Redistribution of Cooperative
Filtering Information" could help here of course, as that was where it
was made for.

Oh btw, some other people mentioned the 'sue' word already when a RIR
might interfere in 'ongoing business from certain people :)
Thus it comes down to one thing: money...

Greets,
 Jeroen

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