16-bit ASN kludge

Fri Dec 3 23:23:55 UTC 2004

I don't see non-transit ASN leakage as any greater issue than current
private ASN leakage.

However, I do see the ability to use non-transit ASNs to multihome end sites
with provider independent addresses and allow better aggregation as a good
thing.  In this case, leakage would only have the same consequences as doing
things the way we do them now.

I don't see a real downside.

Owen

--On Friday, December 3, 2004 18:08 -0500 Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu wrote:

> On Fri, 03 Dec 2004 16:36:39 CST, John Dupuy said:
>> Along these lines, one could leave the transit AS networks alone if a
>> parallel 16 bit ASN space were created. Essentially, any non-transit
>> network would have it's non-public ASN retranslated NAT-style by
>> upstream  transit network border routers. Only the border routers would
>> have to be  changed. They would have to differentiate between public ASN
>> X and  non-public ASN X (same number) based on the which side of the
>> router the  ASN was learned from.
>
> So given the lack of trouble with NAT sites leaking rfc1918 addresses, you
> foresee no problems with sites accidentally leaking the non-public ASN's,
> right?

-- 
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