BGP-based blackholing/hijacking patented in Australia?

Barry Raveendran Greene bgreene at cisco.com
Fri Aug 13 14:50:06 UTC 2004


 
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> The only implementation change to do this would be to provide 
> a link from 
> the webpage where user might have been redirected to the 
> original website 
> they wanted to access (it would have to be done by using 
> proxy service since ip is not directly available). In such a 
> case, this service in case 
> of possibly bad ips only functions as an additional warning 
> that webpage user wanted to access is considered not to be 
> safe and may be used by 
> phishers (is that correct term?). Most users would listen to such a
>  warning and not give any of personal information if this was to be
> a  bank website if they otherwise would have believed the 
> phishing email. At the same time, if blackholing this site 
> was not correct and user really does want to go to that 
> website, person can just click on the link to continue.

Transparent banner insertion might be able to do this. Many of the
caches out there coded this, but operators ended up not using it. 

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