THe Internet is Too Secure Already (was Re: Buying and selling root certificates)
Sean Donelan
sean at donelan.com
Thu Apr 29 03:19:48 UTC 2004
On Wed, 28 Apr 2004, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> Matt Blaze said it well: "A commercial CA will protect you from anyone
> from whom they won't take money."
With current SSL implementations, you have to rely on all of the
commercial CAs not taking the money. Any match wins.
> verification that the spoof was detected. Is this good enough? What's
> your threat model...?
My threat model was simple :-) I wanted to reduce the messages in my logs
about certificate verification failures. I could load a few widely used
CA's or I could just turn certificate verification off (the default) and
the messages would stop.
Eric Rescorla gave a good talk at USENIX Security last year called
"The Internet is Too Secure Already"
http://www.rtfm.com/TooSecure-usenix.pdf
Part of his talk was the threat model mismatch on the Internet.
- Excessive concern with active attacks
- Taking cryptanalytic attacks too seriously
- Forgetting about other threats
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