TCP/BGP vulnerability - easier than you think

Fri Apr 23 15:15:11 UTC 2004

I point out NetBSD released this:

ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2004-006.txt.asc

Of interest is this paragraph:

] Additionally, the 4.4BSD stack from which NetBSD's stack is derived, did
] not even check that a RST's sequence number was inside the window. RSTs
] anywhere to the left of the window were treated as valid.

It's a good thing the 4.4BSD stack was unpopular, otherwise it might be
in a lot of programs.

-- 
       Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - CCIE 3440
        PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/
Read TMBG List - tmbg-list-request at tmbg.org, www.tmbg.org
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