The Internet's Immune System

David A. Ulevitch davidu at
Wed Nov 12 18:15:06 UTC 2003

Christopher X. Candreva wrote:

>So in the above example, if I receive the report for being an
>open proxy, I might have my system configured, because that is a residential
>DSL IP, to automaticly do a full port scan on it to look for open proxies,
>and if I confirm that it is open shut the line down, or just kick out a
>ticket for someone to call the customer. Or, start a netflow analysis on it
>to look for virus/worm traffic. Or not do anything until a certain number of
>reports are received, weighted based on the ranking of PGP sigs.
That's a start, but think about this.  Worms are fast now. [1]

Lets say you have 30 seconds to stop a worm from the time it hits the 
internet to until the time it's fully propagated to the point of serious 
network disruption.

Automated techniques are the only thing that will stop it but is your 
idea "fast enough?"  I don't think so.  Relying on user reports is good 
for compromises and spambots but it won't do anything to stop CodeRed or 

>Paul's use of the word immune system hit it on the head. An immune system
>kicks in automaticly to fight infection, and right now there isn't one on
>the net.
It has to automatically fight it, it has to be accurate and it has to be 

I don't think anything comes close to that today. 



  David A. Ulevitch - Founder, EveryDNS.Net
  Washington University in St. Louis --

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