Using Policy Routing to stop DoS attacks

Christopher L. Morrow chris at UU.NET
Wed May 14 04:06:45 UTC 2003



On Wed, 14 May 2003, Lars Higham wrote:

> Sorry,
>
> I misunderstood the earlier question -
>
> >From the docs:
> To enable unicast RPF check, include the unicast-reverse-path statement
> at the [edit routing-options forwarding-table] hierarchy level:
> [edit] routing-options {
> 	forwarding-table{
> 		unicast-reverse-path (active-paths | feasible-paths);
> 		}
> 	}
>

yes, the config bits are on the website.... BUT, not the details of the
implementation :) So, does uRPF on a juniper work the same as the cisco??
:)

> Regards,
> Lars Higham
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-nanog at merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog at merit.edu] On Behalf Of
> Christopher L. Morrow
> Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 2:00 AM
> To: Stefan Mink
> Cc: Haesu; jtk at aharp.is-net.depaul.edu; nanog at merit.edu
> Subject: Re: Using Policy Routing to stop DoS attacks
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, 12 May 2003, Stefan Mink wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Mar 25, 2003 at 04:58:59PM +0000, Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
> > > you could hold blackhole routes for these destinations in your route
> table
> > > (local or bgp) So long as the destination for the source is bad
> (null for
> > > instance) the traffic would get dropped. I believe the proper terms
> from
> > > cisco for this are: "So long as the adjacency is invalid" ...
> >
> > is there a way to make this source-blackhole-routing work
> > on J's too (does this work with discard-routes too)?
> >
>
> I believe someone from Juniper should likely answer this question :) As
> I
> understand the setup from a Cisco perspective (and someone from Cisco
> can
> correct me if I get it wrong). uRPF works in such a way that if the
> source
> address's destination has an invalid FIB entry (or no entry, or Null0)
> the
> packets are dropped.
>
> Perhaps Juniper implemented it this way? I have not checked anymore
> closely than this. Sorry. :(
>



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