BGP to doom us all
batz
batsy at vapour.net
Sat Mar 1 01:47:36 UTC 2003
On Fri, 28 Feb 2003, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
:But -- given things like the AS7007 incident, and given the possibility
:-- probability? -- that it can happen again, can we afford to not do
:sBGP? My own opinion is that sophisticated routing attacks are the
:single biggest threat to the Internet.
Without sliding into a discussion about what our worst imaginable
attack would be, how are they more of a threat than a worm that
saturates links?
I am interested in how you measure the threat of attacks against
routing protocols against that of something like slammer, as I
would think that routing problems would limit their own propagation
much faster than say, the way slammer slowed itself down by
saturating links.
I am taking sophisticated routing attacks to mean specific protocol
exploitation, instead of attacks on the devices themselves. I would
even suspect that it is not possible for routing information to be
scrambled in any widely propagated and irrepairable way, for similar
reasons to why it can't be kept straight without constant updates.
That is, the routes confusion will limit it's own propagation
precisely because it may no longer know how to propagate itself. Or
rather, the more valid paths valid routing information has, the more
likely it will spread, no?
I wonder how you could test that.
Thanks,
--
batz
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