Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy

Scott Weeks surfer at mauigateway.com
Wed Jul 9 15:41:29 UTC 2003




On Wed, 9 Jul 2003, Jack Bates wrote:

:
: Michael.Dillon at radianz.com wrote:
: > However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is
: > harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they
: > have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increased
: > probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11) and one or more of
: > their targets will escape total destruction.

: interconnect multiple cities as well. The wonderful thing about what we
: created is that just because you shut down an exchange, doesn't mean you
: shut down the network. You can remove Telehouse and even those networks
: who's connectivity in the area you've killed can offload traffic via
: other interconnects. Granted, this means more money spent as traffic
: raises on other routes.
:
: Granted, there are ways to limit local damage, but those are usually
: secondary to the overall network and a little manual intervention can
: usually bring an emergency circuit up in a local market. Do you think
: the destruction of telehouse would have everyone else saying, "I'm sorry
: and sympathetic to your needs, but we just don't have the time right now
: to let you through this fiber path or place equipment in our facility."
:
:
: -Jack (learns about interconnects which are thousands of miles away, of
: no use to his network, but which he hopes to be lucky enough to see someday)
:
:




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