Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy

Wed Jul 9 12:56:37 UTC 2003

Michael.Dillon at radianz.com wrote:
> However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is 
> harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they 
> have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increased 
> probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11) and one or more of 
> their targets will escape total destruction. 
> 

I like maps with circles on them. Triangles are usually good too. 
Mostly, I like to see lots of interconnecting lines.

The last I checked, there are at least two interconnect houses in each 
city. This is true of data and telco layouts. Critical networks tend to 
interconnect multiple cities as well. The wonderful thing about what we 
created is that just because you shut down an exchange, doesn't mean you 
shut down the network. You can remove Telehouse and even those networks 
who's connectivity in the area you've killed can offload traffic via 
other interconnects. Granted, this means more money spent as traffic 
raises on other routes.

Granted, there are ways to limit local damage, but those are usually 
secondary to the overall network and a little manual intervention can 
usually bring an emergency circuit up in a local market. Do you think 
the destruction of telehouse would have everyone else saying, "I'm sorry 
and sympathetic to your needs, but we just don't have the time right now 
to let you through this fiber path or place equipment in our facility."

-Jack (learns about interconnects which are thousands of miles away, of 
no use to his network, but which he hopes to be lucky enough to see someday)