Firewall stateful handling of ICMP packets
Jamie.Reid at mbs.gov.on.ca
Thu Dec 4 03:09:57 UTC 2003
This was a problem when filtering Nachi while it pinged networks
to their knees.
Sometimes I wonder if there is any legitimate reason to allow
pings from users at all. If the user really needed to use
ping, that is, if they were in a position to do anything about the
results of the ping tests, then they would know enough to
use traceroute in UDP mode or some other tool.
There are lots of other useful ICMP types to handle all
the other ICMP needs, but ping seems to be something
that was created for the convenience of a kind of user
that is effectively extinct in todays Internet.
ICMP echo is unique among ICMP types in that it is the
only one that elicits it's own response. What I mean by
this is that source-quench, <foo>-unreachables, and others
are all generated by hosts and routers in response to
relatively stateful traffic. There is nothing that echos
do that SNMP (I know, I know) and traceroute don't
accomplish in a more controlled fashion, no?
It would kill alot of DDoS attacks and render their zombie
networks useless, retire legacy backdoors and viruses, up
the ante for network management tools, and slow down
some virus propagation substantially.
ICMP echos are a bit of a hack and, quite literally, noise,
and I wonder if it may be time to consider unofficially
retiring them using filters.
Jamie.Reid, CISSP, jamie.reid at mbs.gov.on.ca
Senior Security Specialist, Information Protection Centre
Corporate Security, MBS
416 327 2324
>>> "Sean Donelan" <sean at donelan.com> 12/03/03 05:12pm >>>
You could drop ICMP packets at your firewall if the firewalls properly
implemented stateful inspection of ICMP packets. The problem is few
firewalls include ICMP responses in their statefull analysis. So you are
left with two bad choices, permit "all" ICMP packets or deny "all" ICMP
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