The Paradox of Commoditization
Pete Kruckenberg
pete at kruckenberg.com
Thu Apr 10 14:19:51 UTC 2003
Isenberg writes along similar lines:
Rise of the Stupid Network
http://www.isen.com/stupid.html
Chairman Power, Let 'em Fail Fast
http://netparadox.com/
Paradox of the Best Network
http://www.netparadox.com/netparadox.html
How to Monopolize the New Network
http://www.isen.com/archives/030304.html
Pete.
On Wed, 9 Apr 2003, Gordon Cook wrote:
> Date: Wed, 09 Apr 2003 23:53:19 -0400
> From: Gordon Cook <cook at cookreport.com>
> To: nanog at merit.edu
> Subject: The Paradox of Commoditization
>
>
> The Paradox Of Commoditization
>
> Trying To Save What Is Inevitably Lost, We Lose What Could Otherwise Be Gained
>
> Introduction
>
> The monopoly control of customers by Legacy networks is destroying
> the economic benefits that could be obtained from the on going
> pervasive and inexorable commoditization of telecom and information
> technology. We face a paradox. While we have eyes, we cannot see.
>
> We act as though we could wish away what is happening to new products
> and prices. But the fact is that the on-going commoditization of
> technology cannot be undone. Products will continue to get better but
> they will also continue to fall in price. In the face of these
> dynamics jobs will melt away. The only growth in the industry will be
> come from a variety of education, customer support, strategic
> evaluation and consulting positions. The only additional growth can
> come from use of the technologies in an open architecture that
> preserves the freedom to innovate.
>
> If we adopt the mind set that commoditized telecom and IT is basic
> infrastructure, we can struggle to keep the infrastructure open. In
> doing so we shall also keep open a seedbed of new economic
> development and new creativity and technology. In addition to a
> foundation for new business, this course will also support
> opportunity for further growth in customer support and education.
> But, if, as seems currently more likely, we follow the course of
> permitting the legacy industry a closed monopoly in order to save
> itself, we prolong the current agony and forego what economic
> development and growth could flourish in an open environment.
>
> The Commoditization of Everything
>
> We are witnessing the commoditization of the entire industry. It is
> not just telecom. It is telecom and all of information technologies.
> Both industries are finally maturing across the board. While new
> products are appearing, they cost less and do more. They bring a
> different kind of economic value. We are no longer likely to see the
> creation of any new industry giant like a Cisco or Microsoft. Open in
> architecture and cheap to produce, the new products are staggering
> the industry precisely because they are one or more orders of
> magnitude less expensive than the closed and proprietary systems they
> replace.
>
> While most new products are still designed in North America, Japan,
> or Europe, the majority of their components are made and assembled in
> Asia. There RAM is a commodity endlessly replicated in multi billion
> dollar "fabs." Around the 'corner' in Taiwan and other areas,
> commodity disk drives are mass-produced. A terabyte in the pocket is
> not far off. Commodity open source Linux and open source web services
> stand ready to do battle against Microsoft's closed systems.
>
> When new software is needed, it may be designed in North America or
> Europe. But the code is written in Bangalore, or Moscow, or Shanghai.
> Hua wei is sued by Cisco for doing what is in effect a commodity
> knock off. Back 'home" a handful of folk do the integration, first of
> the software, and then of the firmware and prototype hardware. They
> ship the result back to Bangkok or Kuala Lumpur for replication and
> assembly. Container ships bring the boxes back to ports like
> Yokahama, Newark, or Antwerp for sale on the shelves of Best Buy and
> Comp USA and other warehouse retailers. Prices are driven inexorably
> downward.
>
> This new, cheap and powerful hardware and software is being installed
> in networks with fiber cores terminating in monopoly controlled
> copper local loops. If the network is the Stupid network, in other
> words if it is an open access end-to-end Internet, boxes running
> commodity Ethernet can switch and route packetized information as
> appropriate. With the addition of a VoIP gateway card, the same
> devices can achieve vast cost savings by turning voice telephony into
> an application that rides alongside other digitized and commoditized
> applications such as email, web services, and television.
>
> But most networks are not open Internets. They are copper based
> networks with last miles subject to a monopoly controlled, content
> centric approach. They are bastions of legacy technology using an
> infrastructure far more complex and 10 to 100 times more expensive
> than that of the Stupid network. The legacy telco network is one
> where the monopoly must cut its own throat to try to compete with
> open architecture Internet upstarts that would take away its more
> profitable business customers. In other words, while the prices it
> receives for its services plummet, it must write down the value of
> its plant and equipment to a level where, given its smaller income,
> it cannot maintain its current cost and employment structure and
> sustain the ability to pay its debt.
>
> When voice no longer rides on the TDM transport that was especially
> designed to carry it and is just a packet-encapsulated application on
> an IP network, the new central office is no longer a building housing
> five million dollars worth of equipment. It fits on a desktop using
> SIP, SIP proxy servers, and ENUM databases. It costs well under five
> thousand dollars and delivers an entire range of services not
> possible to derive from now obsolete TDM hardware costing a thousand
> times more.
>
> Commoditization Makes More Job Losses Inevitable
>
> If telecom in the United States has lost 500,000 jobs in the past
> three years, with the inevitable demise of the LECs, it will lose
> another 500,000. Attrition in computer hardware and software should
> cause 500,000 more positions to evaporate. What is left will be
> administrative, financial product planning and marketing.
> Unfortunately, in this brave new world the marketers will be figuring
> out how sell $100 products in Best Buys rather than $100,000 systems
> to enterprises.
>
> As a result of this upheaval, customers will be left even more on
> their own. They will need help to figure out how to put the products
> together and assess what combination of products most effectively
> meets their needs. Until everything is truly plug-and-play and
> automatically-configured when attached to the network, education of
> the customer on product capability and system integration is the
> remaining critical area of competition. It is also the only bright
> spot for future industry employment.
>
> Commoditization dictates competition. But now that the companies are
> in trouble, competition on the part of the legacy, monopoly-owned,
> circuit-switched side of the telecom business is being allowed to
> disappear. Until the legacy companies go bankrupt and swap out their
> obsolete equipment, there can be no benefit to anyone from
> commoditization.
>
> The innovation and cost performance benefits of commoditization are
> all on the side of the open access, end-to-end, packet-based
> inter-networks. So far such networks in competition with each other
> for market share cannot make a profit.
>
> The mind-set of the political and regulatory system cannot comprehend
> the resulting paradox where the most productive and advanced networks
> cannot make money because, founded on commodity technology, they can
> be cheaply cloned with cookie cutter reliability. Staring into the
> headlights of the onrushing train wreck, it is blinded by fear of the
> destruction of shareholder equity and putting people out of work. It
> is seduced by the complaints of the incumbents who are selling the
> false premise: "Give us monopoly and we will have incentive to
> build." Determined to protect legacy interests, it consequently tilts
> the playing field in the US against the commodity players and against
> innovation.
>
> The truth is that, even with monopoly, will they not build. They will
> instead die, unless somehow, they managed to get use of the
> packet-switched, commodity-based technology successfully outlawed.
>
> To our great misfortune we do not yet understand that Commoditization
> has turned telecom and information technology into a basic enabling
> infrastructure like the electric, the water, the sewer and the
> highway grids. This new commoditized, powerful, and cheap technology
> can be used to deliver value and new jobs through preserving for
> everyone the ability to tinker and to innovate. Commoditization has
> removed the incentive for value creation from the monopoly network
> and left it with only the incentive to squeeze every penny of return
> for as long as it can prevent encroachment.
>
> The Legacy networks can and do use the new IP, commodity technology.
> But they are prevented by their debt obligations from being able to
> acquire enough of it. Furthermore, even if they could implement it
> extensively, their business model assumes a monopoly over access to
> transport. Because they must do it all, they are paradoxically denied
> its fullest advantage. The find themselves with no choice but to use
> packet switching and VoIP in an effort to sustain their traditional
> way of doing things. Protecting what they have, they lose what gains
> the new inexpensive equipment could offer.
>
> For example they would seek to offer international VoIP over their
> own dedicated network while a new competitor can dispense with the
> sunk cost of maintaining a physical network by simply renting access
> to an Internet that others maintain. Since the competition has only
> to rent access to transport and run voice as an application on that
> transport, it can offer service that is unencumbered by legacy costs.
> The business model of control of both applications and customers
> prevents productive investment.
>
> The paradox of commoditization leaves us with our uninhibited
> creativity as our only new source of economic development and growth.
> If all we do is drive prices down while maintaining the old
> structures, all we do is drive more people out of work. Failure to
> understand this leaves the legacy networks in power and able to
> preserve their obsolete assets by killing creativity, innovation, and
> experimentation.
>
> The backyard tinkerer has for the past century been the principal
> source of wealth in the United States. In the inexorable transition
> to a new commodity-based world, given current policy, we are
> exporting the freedom to be a tinkerer to Canada, Sweden, Japan and
> Korea. Having to compete in a global economy, we are sacrificing the
> viability of our resulting economic infrastructure in a foolish
> attempt to shore up legacy networks that can no longer serve as
> adequate means of competition.
>
> These are the lessons we carried home from Spring 2003 Voice on the
> Network where most were upbeat and pitching in to spread the new
> application
>
> April 7, 2003
>
>
>
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