no ip forged-source-address
Lars Erik Gullerud
lerik at nolink.net
Wed Oct 30 19:02:13 UTC 2002
On Wed, 2002-10-30 at 16:44, variable at ednet.co.uk wrote:
> Therefore, would it be a reasonable suggestion to ask router vendors to
> source address filtering in as an option[1] on the interface and then move
> it to being the default setting[2] after a period of time? This appeared
> to have some success with reducing the number of networks that forwarded
> broadcast packets (as with "no ip directed-broadcast").
[snip]
> [1] For example, an IOS config might be:
>
> interface fastethernet 1/0
> no ip forged-source-address
Well, this already exists, doesn't it? Try the following on your
customer-facing interface:
ip verify unicast source reachable-via rx
> [2] Network admins would still have the option of turning it off, but this
> would have to be explicitly configured.
I have a feeling that having strict uRPF as the default setting on an
interface would be very badly received by a lot of ISP's. I know I
certainly wouldn't like it very much.
Is it really the job of router vendors to protect the net from
lazy/incompetent/ignorant network admins?
/leg
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