Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

Thu May 2 04:39:12 UTC 2002

On Wed, 1 May 2002, dies wrote:

>
>
> Then you are pushing out /32's and peers would need to accept them.  Then
> someone will want to blackhole /30's, /29's, etc.  Route bloat.  Yum!
>

Yes.

> Additionally you are creating a way to basically destroy the Internet as a
> whole.  One kiddie gets ahold of a router, say of a large backbone
> provider, takes one of their aggregate blocks (/16? /10? /8?) and splits
> it into /32 announcements.
>

Or, blackhole the /16 :) more fun! (assuming no other smaller
announcements inside that /16 of course)

> Anyways, some providers already allow you to set a community on a route,
> and they will inturn "blackhole" it for you.  I believe Teleglobe does
> this for some customers and I know UUNet does this for all customers.

Hmm, Mr. 'dies' is almost correct... if you are a UUNET customer and you
would like to do this please call the customer service center and they
will help you to configure this 'service'.

Thanks though Mr. 'dies' :)

>
> On Wed, 1 May 2002, Wojtek Zlobicki wrote:
>
> >
> > > > What processes and/or tools are large networks using to
> > > > identify and limit the impact of DDoS attacks?
> > >
> > > A great deal of thought is being expended on this question, I am certain,
> > > however, how many of these thought campaings have born significant fruit
> > yet,
> > > I do not know.
> >
> > How about the following :
> >
> > We develop a new community , being fully transitive (666 would be
> > appropriate ) and either build into router code or create a route map to
> > null route anything that contains this community.  The effect of this being
> > the distribution of the force of the attack.
> >
> > This aside, how effective would be using a no export community with ones
> > peers (being non transitive, it would still distribute the force of the
> > attack).
> >
> >
> >
>