Persistent BGP peer flapping - do you care?
vijay at umbc.edu
Thu Jan 17 22:42:53 UTC 2002
On Thu, 17 Jan 2002, Dave Israel wrote:
> It's a question of robustness; if the new spec includes a way to be
> tolerant of how the spec is (or can be) commonly abused, then the
> followers of the spec will not be at the mercy of those who deviate.
> In this case, I think that having the option to keep a session that
> gives bad routes up, and just dropping the route, is a good answer.
> That would allow the user to determine which is preferable for a given
> peer: possible corruption or certain disconnection.
If you have a "bad route" how do you know the rest of the update is good?
The nlri may have gotten corrupted on the wire or between the interface
and the processor (parity error, or some sort of corruption on the bus).
Given that case, in an update, I am not sure you can make a determination
of what is good nlri and selectively propogate and process those. See also
meltdowns circa nov 1998.
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