Shared facilities (was Re: your mail)

Wed Aug 21 07:30:42 UTC 2002

At 02:03 AM 8/21/2002 -0400, Sean Donelan wrote:

>On Wed, 21 Aug 2002, David Lesher wrote:
> > Unnamed Administration sources reported that N. Richard Solis said:
> > > If you haven't worked in an environment where you had to turn in your
> > > cellphone and pager at the front desk, show a badge to a camera 
> around every
> > > corner, and get your office keys from a vending machine you dont know 
> what
> > > real security looks like.
> > You missed the places w/ real security. That's where the very
> > polite Marine Security Guard with the 870 shotgun asks to see
> > your badge again...
>
>Sigh, and in places with "real security" you rarely find enemies/competitors
>sitting in the same room.  Exchange points are like the United Nations,
>not high security military bases.  AMS-IX, Equinix, Linx/Telehouse, PAIX,
>etc provide a neutral facility for competitors to exchange network traffic.
>The facility operators provide a reasonable level of security, and try to
>keep the diplomats from punching each other.  Its in all (most?) the
>competitors' self-interest to follow the rules.

Sean, I have to disagree with you. All the transport I've designed so far
works on the age old model that RBOC tech's don't care and they
have unescorted access to the cross connect area.

The actual colo area is where you have to worry about immature activity.

Since Sept 11, my experience probably doesn't cut the mustard, but that's
how it has been to this point.

>Let's not lose sight of the purpose of colocation/exchange points.
>If we start requiring you to be a US citizen and have top secret
>clearance in order to enter a colocation facility, we've probably
>decreased the usefulness of the exchange points.

I think my point above exemplifies this.

NO colo is secure from attack. No matter what they do.

Regards,

--
Martin Hannigan                    hannigan at fugawi.net