Broadband security?

Joe Blanchard jblanchard at wyse.com
Wed May 16 10:52:50 UTC 2001


Please excuse the redundancy regarding this topic, but I can't help
publisizing this. 
A few weeks ago I came across a rather odd opening regarding a certain ISP
and its Cayman's DSL routers.  Oddly enough I found 19 open routers actually
telling/publisizing that there was no password set for the admin account
using little more than a web browser (of course one of them being mine). A
bit concerned I contacted the ISP in question, their NOC to be exact, and
told them of this. During the conversation it was pretty clear that the NOC
person didn't really care, and that "The customer is responsible for that
security" or better said (not my job) applied within this situation. A bit
concerned I contacted a sales rep from that same ISP and got this "wow,
really, can you send me those IP addys and we'll look into it right away!".
With some strange sense of helpfulness I sent those items to him and heard
not a word. That was about 2 weeks ago, and I again checked on the nodes I
had seen them open and found the same openings. I thought perhaps it was
just a honey pot, but after changing two of the routers then restarting them
and seeing the changes I knew nothing had been done. On a whem, and sort of
a bet, I did a scan of the ISP's net and found over 100 Cayman routers open,
as well some odd 20 SpeedStream routers (simple password/login just give it
admin and you have the keys to the kingdom so to speak). To me, and perhaps
I am missing something here, This seems a bit odd, in that a major ISP
deploying these items would in fact leave routers, ok junior routers, this
wide open. I really don't want to name the ISP in question openly for the
obvious reasons, but has it really gotten to the point that Broadband for
businesses is slapped in with no security and no education to the persons
getting it?

Sorry for the rant
-Joe
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