scarter at pobox.com
Thu Apr 15 09:32:45 UTC 1999
Sean Donelan wrote:
> 184.108.40.206 is announced by NTIS's ASN 10616 via UUNET ASN 701. I could
> not find a valid aut-num object for ASN 10616, and the covering route object
> for 220.127.116.11 was an old SURANET/BBN block for 192.239/16 indicating
> a source AS 1.
This is reasonably typical ...
> The lack of correct current routing registry information for the IRS web
> site doesn't seem to have hurt its connectivity. Other the other hand,
> it also wouldn't hurt the connectivity of someone impersonating the IRS
> web site network route. The rest of the Internet just has to take the
> routes on faith.
Don't let a route being registered in one of the routing registries lull
you into a false sense of security (sic), there is zero to very little
real authentication done on a route registration. It only takes an ounce
(or less) knowledge to register a route as being originated from any AS.
Do I think this is a real problem? It hasn't been so far, probably due to
our cooperative and trusting nature >;). I think it would take quite some
resources and reputation killing stupidity (or malice) to inject 'illegal'
routes and then do something meaningful with them.
More information about the NANOG