Government scrutiny is headed our way

Sat Jun 20 16:18:20 UTC 1998

Well DoS and smurf are only different in terms of the packet amounts and
method to convey them, so in essence A smurf is another form of DoS on
A larger scale. An existing law already covers that.

If A NOC refuses to obey the law and investigate on behalf of a paying
client that DoS has occurred than they become party to a criminal act
after the fact and are as guilty as the originator of the attack and can
be held accountable and their staff can arrested and you have the
right to sue for $4000.00 as do each one of your individual
customers.

Sometimes you have to look at what you have and realize how
to use it for the benefit of the whole.

As for smurfs crossing international borders where such attacks generally
occur from, A group representation to the FCC needs to be formed and
the FCC needs then to communicate with its counterpart on the foreign
soil using existing treaties that would make that a violation of non
aggression
pacts and interference in a foreign government and denial of its citizens to
communicate pursuant to their constitution  the right of free speech.

In A technical sense smurfs from foreign shores are an act of war on
networks of the United States by the purposeful intent to disrupt
destroy and cripple its computer network infrastructure with A
Smurfing mechanism.

Henry R. Linneweh

Hal Murray wrote:

> > This is why the government needs to get involved and *demand* that
> > the ability exist via a *protocol* for people in a NOC to initiate
> > and follow these traces automatically, without human intervention
> > by the NOCs in the chain.
>
> Would you and other operators be willing to modify peering agreements
> to include serious fines for running a smurf amplifier or allowing
> packets with bogus source addresses to enter the system?
>
> Tracking back bogus source addresses seems hard.  Would fines on
> smurf amplifiers be good enough to fix the smurf problem?  Or do
> we need to catch a smurfer to use as an example?
>
> Currently, NOCs don't have much financial interest in tracking down
> a smurfer.
>
> Karl's stories of non-cooperation make sense if the NOC is looking
> at their (short term) bottom line rather than the good of the net.
> The person on the phone won't get any reward for solving Karl's problem
> (and might get in trouble for sticking his neck out).
>
> Is there a way we can change that?
>
> One possibility might be to offer a reward to the NOC that gets the
> evidence on the first smurfer to get tossed in jail or fined more
> than $100K.
>
> Another might be to setup peering contracts that encourage ISPs/NSPs
> to track down smurfers.
>
> I can't quite come up with the right thing to suggest.  Everything
> I think of has too many possibilities for gaming.
>
> I'm fishing for something like each ISP/NSP that works on tracking
> down a smurfer gets to charge the ISP/NSP closer to the source for
> the time and costs it spends on the problem, including the costs
> that get passed to it.
>
> How much effort is involved in tracking a smurfer through each router?
>
> Any router vendors willing to estimate how much it would cost to
> implement something like Karl's proposed command?
>
> >       "trace-smurf <forged-victim-address> <amplifier-address>" <return>
>
> Do smurf attacks always happen late at night and on weekends?
>
> Would major NSPs be willing to setup a smurf hotline so trusted smart
> people, like Karl, could bypass the first several layers of screening
> and get the data to the right person fast?

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