not rewriting next-hop, pointing default, ...

Ran Atkinson rja at
Thu Sep 11 23:04:48 UTC 1997

On Sep 11 15:54, Randy Bush wrote:
} Subject: Re: not rewriting next-hop, pointing default, ...
> LSR is actually a significant security issue.  So, while I do
> understand and am sympathetic to the operational debugging
> issues that LSR addresses, I think that requiring a peer to
> enable LSR more than 2 hops inside their network from the
> outside world is unreasonable.

% So, you're comfortable with asking for LSR at the IX and a hop behind?

"Comfortable" isn't the word I'd choose.  Ideally, I'd filter
out LSR entirely [1], but there are real operational issues.

Letting LSR in two hops lets outsiders trying to debug (e.g. some
routing problem) at least perform first-level fault-isolation
so they know whose NOC to call for further debugging assistance.
So I view the 2-hop notion as an attempt at "reasonable compromise".

> In a world where SSH were available in cisco routers and/or
> IPsec were more widely deployed, I might have different views.

% K5 does not give you sufficient warm fuzzies?

No, I'm afraid that Kerberos 5 doesn't give me sufficient warm
fuzzies.  I don't care to be very detailed on a public list
such as NANOG.  I will note that aside from my non-public
concerns, Kerberos-5 is expensive to deploy and maintain.
Kerberos can also adversely impact network availability if
it isn't installed in exactly the right way (surprisingly few
folks seem to do it right).

rja at

	- I'm not a security expert, so my opinion probably doesn't
		mean very much in the grand scheme of things.
	- I am NOT with @Home's Security Group, which is ably managed
		by Mike StJohns, who is a Security Expert.  So don't
		blame them for my comments.
	- I don't make policy for @Home, so my opinions are just mine
		not my employer's.
	- I haven't had enough coffee yet today. :-)

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