FBI calls for mandatory key escrow; Denning on export ctrls
Jay R. Ashworth
jra at scfn.thpl.lib.fl.us
Thu Sep 4 14:37:51 UTC 1997
On Thu, Sep 04, 1997 at 09:23:49AM -0400, Selina F. Priestley wrote:
> Let's turn this into a useful conversation: If we do not believe that getting
> a backdoor to our keys is a useful way to insure security on the network, maybe
> isn't even addressing the root issues, then
Nope, it's not. "Ensuring security" implies making certain that _no
one_ can get copies of the keys; the entire thesis is shot down by
key-escrow.
> What *are* the real issues with security on the network? How should we work to
> address these issues, both at the network and application layers? How will this
> solve the 'child porn problem'? What are the barriers involved in any proposed
> solutions?
The real issue _here_ is that the government _does not want_ us to
operate 'secure' networks... because then _they_ can't look at the
traffic. (CALEA notwithstanding) Oh, and BTW: in light of CALEA, why
do they _care_ if they can crack the code? We're required to help them
tap the cleartext anyway... (at least, for _network imposed_ encryption).
> How can we trace criminals/spam artists/hackers easily and hand them over to
> the feds w/o handing over our rights as well?
Short answer: we can't.
> If we don't have any answers to these questions, and plans for getting there,
> then we might as well quit our bitching.
As Clancy once put it: you can be a policeman of a soldier... but not
both.
Are we network operators, or cops?
I think we've probably reached the end of the "useful operational
content" in this thread... unless anyone has a "this is what _we_ did"
story.
Cheers,
-- jra
--
Jay R. Ashworth jra at baylink.com
Member of the Technical Staff Unsolicited Commercial Emailers Sued
The Suncoast Freenet "People propose, science studies, technology
Tampa Bay, Florida conforms." -- Dr. Don Norman +1 813 790 7592
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