FBI calls for mandatory key escrow; Denning on export ctrls
Selina F. Priestley
selina at ans.net
Thu Sep 4 13:23:49 UTC 1997
> On Wednesday, September 03, 1997 7:34 PM, Charles Sprickman
> [SMTP:spork at inch.com] wrote:
> > > MR. FREEH:
> > > We work, as you know, particularly in the
> > > pedophile cases, with on-line services who give us,
> > For God's sake, what is the obsession with pedophiles?? How many
> > pedophiles pgp encode their porn??
> Seriously, they try to grasp at the smallest things.
> If I lock my porn in a 40 ft thick steel safe, does that mean I have to give
> uncle sam a key if they ask?
> US Government restrictions (and a few other anal countries out there), are
> getting silly. When the law is being made by people who don't understand the
> problem, people who don't understand the benefits, and people who have no clue
> what they are making the laws for, then we have a serious issue on our hands
> and it's time we start thinking about getting some knowledgable people into
> Makes you just want to move to Mars and start all over doesn't it?
Let's turn this into a useful conversation: If we do not believe that getting
a backdoor to our keys is a useful way to insure security on the network, maybe
isn't even addressing the root issues, then
What *are* the real issues with security on the network? How should we work to
address these issues, both at the network and application layers? How will this
solve the 'child porn problem'? What are the barriers involved in any proposed
How can we trace criminals/spam artists/hackers easily and hand them over to
the feds w/o handing over our rights as well?
If we don't have any answers to these questions, and plans for getting there,
then we might as well quit our bitching.
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