Incentive for route stabilty
Justin W. Newton
justin at erols.com
Fri Nov 1 21:46:53 UTC 1996
At 11:15 AM 11/1/96 -0800, Eric Ziegast wrote:
>> Finanical compensation for bgp dampening policies.
>>
>> Deep pockets = very little flap penalty
>> Shallow pockets = very heavy flap penalty
>
>The main risk (IMHO) when accepting a new peer is how stable the peer
>is. Without confidence in the design of the peer's network or trust
>in its engineers to prevent/solve problems, connecting to a new peer
>with a significant number of routes can be scary. A peer's having
>deep pockets usually implies that there's more to lose if they mess
>up and that they _might_ want to hire good engineers and pre-plan
>their network, but whether they actually do is another story. :^(
Well, now that the ra statistics page has information on this sort of thing
couldn't that be used as a tool for determining if provider X is doing a
good job of keeping their external announcements stable. This is only
possible if the person in question has been perring with /someone/ for a
reasonable period of time.
Justin Newton
Network Architect
Erol's Internet Services
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