security hole in swais, FYI
Peter Schmid - UnixOps
schmid at refuge.Colorado.EDU
Wed Sep 2 13:06:48 UTC 1992
yet another of these WAIS thingies. FYI. res. -- pete
Jonny Goldman <jonathan at Think.COM> writes:
* From: Marten Terpstra <Marten.Terpstra at ripe.net>
* Date: Tue, 01 Sep 92 15:46:22 +0200
* We've known about this.The solution is to run swais under a chroot, wit
* very limited bin directory. This is how swais is run on Quake, and we'
* had no evidence of any tampering.
The version I have (b4) does not have a chroot in it. Currently we are
running without the mail and pipe options ...
The loss of a pipe option is no problem, the mail option is.
* I've done this by using a special .cshrc, but I just thought of a way t
* could be defeated. Hmmm, I want users to be able to use a limited set
* commands. Perhaps swais needs a "secure" command list.
A secure command list would be very nice, or perhaps like other programs a
simple compile time enable/disable flag for each command. Pagers like "less
have something along these lines.
Anyway, let us know if something more "safe" comes along.
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