RPKI unknown for superprefixes of existing ROA ?

Sun Oct 22 18:20:56 UTC 2023

I agree that a good, sensible defense would be to simply announce your
entire address block, e.g., in the example, your entire /22 (with a ROA to
your ASN), and filter the traffic to the unused prefixes. Basically, I
guess, it means that the AS 0 solution shouldn't be used, at least not
usually. I wonder if anyone is using it , in fact. It would be nice to know
if someone has the data handy.

Thanks! Amir
-- 
Amir Herzberg

Comcast professor of Security Innovations, Computer Science and
Engineering, University of Connecticut
Homepage: https://sites.google.com/site/amirherzberg/home
`Applied Introduction to Cryptography' textbook and lectures:
https://sites.google.com/site/amirherzberg/cybersecurity

On Sun, Oct 22, 2023 at 1:50 PM Tom Beecher <beecher at beecher.cc> wrote:

> Look again, Tom. This is an attack vector using a LESS specific route. The
>> /22 gets discarded, but a covering /0-/21 would not.
>>
>
> Yes. And reliant on the operator doing something exceptionally not smart
> to begin with.  Relying on an AS0 ROA alone and not actually announcing the
> covering prefix as well isn't a good thing to do.
>
> On Sun, Oct 22, 2023 at 1:39 PM Owen DeLong <owen at delong.com> wrote:
>
>> Look again, Tom. This is an attack vector using a LESS specific route.
>> The /22 gets discarded, but a covering /0-/21 would not.
>>
>> Owen
>>
>> On Oct 22, 2023, at 10:06, Tom Beecher <beecher at beecher.cc> wrote:
>>
>> 
>>
>>> And is it your belief that this addresses the described attack vector?
>>> AFAICT, it does not.
>>>
>>
>> Quoting myself :
>>
>> WITH the assertion that all routers in the routing domain are RPKI
>>> enabled, and discarding RPKI INVALIDs.
>>>
>>
>>  In the mixed RPKI / non-RPKI environment of today's internet, no it
>> doesn't. This does not mean that RPKI is deficient, or the AS 0 ROA doesn't
>> work as intended, as was stated.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 22, 2023 at 12:57 PM William Herrin <bill at herrin.us> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Oct 22, 2023 at 9:38 AM Tom Beecher <beecher at beecher.cc> wrote:
>>> >> He's saying that someone could come along and advertise 0.0.0.0/1 and
>>> >> 128.0.0.0/1 and by doing so they'd hijack every unrouted address
>>> block
>>> >> regardless of the block's ROA.
>>> >>
>>> >> RPKI is unable to address this attack vector.
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6483
>>> >
>>> > Section 4
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> A ROA with a subject of AS 0 (AS 0 ROA) is an attestation by the
>>> >> holder of a prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more
>>> >> specific prefix, should not be used in a routing context.
>>>
>>> And is it your belief that this addresses the described attack vector?
>>> AFAICT, it does not.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Bill Herrin
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> William Herrin
>>> bill at herrin.us
>>> https://bill.herrin.us/
>>>
>>
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