Generally accepted BGP acceptance criteria?

Tue Nov 21 03:02:52 UTC 2023

> On Nov 17, 2023, at 6:58 AM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> On Thu, Nov 16, 2023 at 9:31 PM Tom Samplonius <tom at samplonius.org> wrote:
> 
>>>  The most surprising thing in the DE-DIX flow chart, was that they check that the origin AS exists in the IRR as-set, before doing RPKI, and if the set existence fails, they reject the route.  I don’t see a problem with this, as maintaining as-sets is easy, but it does prevent an eventual 100% RPKI future with no IRR at all.
> 
> I don't think the future is ever really 'no irr'.
>  * RPKI provides: "a cryptographically verifiable method to determine
> authority to use ip number resources"
>  * OriginValidation provides: "A route origin authorization
> 'database' for use eventually on BGP speakers"

  Those both amount to the ability to originate a prefix though.

> IRR filters provide control over whom is provided reachability through
> a particular peering/path.

  How does that work?  IRR import: and export: parameters are poorly implemented.  Is anyone actually validating more than the origin with IRR?

> (dale points this out as well, particularly the part about paths he points out)

Tom