BGP-iSec: Improved Security of Internet Routing Against Post-ROV Attacks

Mon Nov 20 15:44:03 UTC 2023

Lancheng, thanks for your comment.

About ProConi (and ASPA): so, we're aware it's more challenging than ASPA
and have evaluated the effort required - it actually doesn't seem too bad,
although that doesn't mean that it'll be cost effective to use it. But as
I've mentioned in an earlier email to this list, Joel Halpern (cc:ed) has
alerted us to an even larger problem with ProConi; the proconi list of a
given AS may become incorrect due to certain changes in AS relationships,
leading to possible false-positives for possibly significant time. This is
obviously very problematic and we are editing this part of the paper to
reflect this risk. Probably, this mechanism should not be deployed;
luckily, we obtained good results also with the other defenses against
leakage in the paper, for the practical case of non-eavesdropping
adversary. In any case we see the work as the opening point, or another
step, toward more effective defenses against path manipulations and
intentional route leaks. More work should be done.

We look forward to meeting you in NDSS; I haven't yet seen list of accepted
papers, and it'll be great if you can share your paper. But if not, then
we'll see it in the conference :)

best, Amir
-- 
Amir Herzberg

Comcast professor of Security Innovations, Computer Science and
Engineering, University of Connecticut
Homepage: https://sites.google.com/site/amirherzberg/home
`Applied Introduction to Cryptography' textbook and lectures:
https://sites.google.com/site/amirherzberg/cybersecurity

On Mon, Nov 20, 2023 at 5:30 AM Lancheng Qin <qlc19 at mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
wrote:

> Hi Amir,
>
>
>
> I really enjoy reading this paper, and I’m interested in your design of
> preventing attribute manipulations and route leaks.
>
>
>
> I think BGP-iSec is useful under a Global Attacker. But I have some
> concerns about using ProConIP-list under a Full Attacker (in Sec. III-B).
> Using ProConIP-list requires the origin AS clearly knows its provider cone,
> which is challenging in practice. Although we can use CAIDA topology to
> infer the provider cone of an AS, some provider-customer relationships may
> not be discovered by CAIDA topology or other existing AS relationship
> inference algorithms. If the ProConIP-list is not accurate or complete
> (i.e., covering all BGP-iSec-adopting ASes in the provider cone), it may
> cause legitimate BGP announcements to be dropped. Compared to publishing
> the whole provider cone, ASPA requires an AS to publish its provider ASes,
> which is easier and more feasible. Can we use BGP-iSec and ASPA together? Would
> that be more beneficial?
>
>
>
> BTW, I will also present my new work on routing security in NDSS’2024.
> Looking forward to discussing more with you in San Diego:)
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Lancheng Qin
>
>
>
>
>
> -----原始邮件-----
> *发件人:* "Amir Herzberg" <amir.lists at gmail.com>
> *发送时间:* 2023-11-11 07:02:48 (星期六)
> *收件人:* NANOG <nanog at nanog.org>
> *主题:* BGP-iSec: Improved Security of Internet Routing Against Post-ROV
> Attacks
>
> Hi NANOGers,
>
>
> We will present our new work, titled: `BGP-iSec: Improved Security of
> Internet Routing Against Post-ROV Attacks', in NDSS'24.
>
>
> If you're interested in security of Internet routing (BGP), and want a
> copy, see URL below, drop me a message/email - or see us in the conference
> - or just read the final version.
>
>
> Available from:
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/375553362_BGP-iSec_Improved_Security_of_Internet_Routing_Against_Post-ROV_Attacks
> --
> Amir Herzberg
>
> Comcast professor of Security Innovations, Computer Science and
> Engineering, University of Connecticut
> Homepage: https://sites.google.com/site/amirherzberg/home
> `Applied Introduction to Cryptography' textbook and lectures:
> https://sites.google.com/site/amirherzberg/cybersecurity
>
>
>
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