BGP Experiment

Wed Jan 9 18:50:15 UTC 2019

On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 9:32 PM Saku Ytti <saku at ytti.fi> wrote:
> Those are scheduled, they have to meet some criteria to be pushed on
> scheduled lot. There are also out of cycle SIRTs. And yes, vendors are
> delaying them, because customers don't want to upgrade often, because
> customer's customers don't want to see connections down often.

Yep. The same happened before e.g. to MSFT products and Adobe Flash
for a decade before the former have started to update in days no
matter what, and before the latter was effectively pushed out of most
market niches.

>>  — just like we did with IoT in 2016 —
> Internet still running, I'm still getting paid.

Well, I know a couple of guys who aren't.

> But motivation to simply DoS internet doesn't really
> exist.

Except for hacktivism, fun, gathering a rep within a cracker society,
gathering a rep within one's middle school community, et cetera.  But
anyway,

> DoS is against service end points, infrastucture is trivial
> target, but for some reason not really targeted.

It really is.  ISPs don't get that quite frequently for now, but
end-user network services sometimes do.

> I'm sure state actors have library of DoS transit packets and
> BGP UPDATE packets to be deployed when strategy requires
> given network or region to be
> disrupted.

There's hardly a reason to rely on your next door neighbor's kid not
chatting on the same Darknet forums where those "state actors" get
their data from.  "State actor" thing is highly overrated today.  They
are certainly powerful but hardly more powerful than a skilled team of
anonymous blackhat researchers going in for ransom money.

--
Töma