"Defensive" BGP hijacking?

Mon Sep 12 16:51:23 UTC 2016

On Mon 2016-Sep-12 09:31:41 -0700, Scott Weeks <surfer at mauigateway.com> wrote:

Full disclosure:  I had a working relationship with Bryant when he was 
still at Staminus.

Bryant (if you're on list):
I mean no harm by this and never had any trouble working with you.  I just 
believe this is a conversation that needs to be had.

>--- blake at ispn.net wrote:
>From: Blake Hudson <blake at ispn.net>
>Scott Weeks wrote on 9/12/2016 11:08 AM:
>> From: NANOG <nanog-bounces at nanog.org> on behalf
>> of Blake Hudson <blake at ispn.net>
>
>
>> My suggestion is that BackConnect/Bryant Townsend should have their ASN
>> revoked for fraudulently announcing another organization's address
>> space. They are not law enforcement, they did not have a warrant or
>> judicial oversight, they were not in immediate mortal peril, etc, etc.
>> -------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>> Are the RIRs the internet police?
>
>
>ARIN has policies against fraudulently obtaining resources and has
>policies for revoking said resources. One could argue that announcing
>another org's IP resources without authorization is fraud and that said
>ip resources were fraudulently obtained during the time they were
>announced by BlackConnect. That said, this ASN was obtained through RIPE
>(despite the person/company being located in Calfornia, USA) and I did
>not see any RIPE policies related to fraud.
>
>My thought is that if Mr Townsend shows disregard for the stability of
>the internet by hijacking other's IP space, he should not be allowed to
>participate. There are comments to the Kreb's article indicating that
>this was not an isolated incident by Mr Townsend and instead represents
>one event in a pattern of behavior.
>-------------------------------------------------
>
>
>I am somewhat in agreement with Mel:
>
>"This thoughtless action requires a response from the community, and an
>apology from BackConnect.   If we can't police ourselves, someone we
>don't like will do it for us. "
>
>But the first part seems to verge on vigilantism.  

Operators are free to do whatever they like inside their own networks as 
long as they don't impact others.  Barring RPKI coverage, we're still 
talking about an element of trust in BGP to believe what AS 203959 tells 
us.  If I no longer believe what 203959 advertises, I don't have to accept 
anything with aspath .* 203959 .* in it.  I don't see routing policy 
decisions in my own network as vigilantism.

>Solutions are hard. BGP filters should be in place.  Maybe that's the 
>non-vigilante response. Force filters somehow.
>
>However, this has all been discussed over and over here...  ;-)
>
>
>scott

-- 
Hugo Slabbert       | email, xmpp/jabber: hugo at slabnet.com
pgp key: B178313E   | also on Signal
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