Netflix banning HE tunnels

Mon Jun 20 23:28:12 UTC 2016

> On Jun 20, 2016, at 13:45 , Mark Andrews <marka at isc.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> In message <E67D028D-2A66-453C-9D8B-0AC8FEA88131 at delong.com>, Owen DeLong writes:
>> 
>>> On Jun 17, 2016, at 10:10 , Mark Milhollan <mlm at pixelgate.net> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Tue, 14 Jun 2016, Owen DeLong wrote:
>>>> On Jun 14, 2016, at 11:57 , Ricky Beam <jfbeam at gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>>> I've seen many "IPv6 Capable" CPEs that apply ZERO security to IPv6
>> traffic.
>>>> 
>>>> Those are by definition poorly designed CPE.
>>> 
>>> This (open by default vs closed) has been discussed before, with plenty
>>> of people on either side.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> /mark
>> 
>> I’m unaware of anyone advocating open inbound by default residential CPE.
>> 
>> I’m not saying they don’t exist, but I can’t imagine how anyone could
>> possibly defend that position rationally.
>> 
>> I’m pretty much in favor of open by default in most things, but for
>> inbound traffic to residential CPE? Even I find that hard to rationalize.
>> 
>> Owen
>> 
> 
> For a lot of homes it actually makes sense.  You laptops are safe
> as they are designed to be connected directly to the Internet.  We
> do this all the time.  Similarly phone and tablets are designed to
> be directly connected to the Internet.  I know that lots of us do
> this all the time.  Think about what happens at conferences.  There
> is no firewall there to save you but we all regularly connect our
> devices to the conference networks.
> 
> Lots of other stuff is also designed to be directly connected to
> the Internet.
> 
> Finding ways to successfully attack a machine from outside is
> actually hard and has been for many years now.
> 
> There is lots of FUD being thrown around about IoT.  Some machines
> will be compromised but as a class of devices there is no reason
> to assume that manufactures haven't learn from what happened to
> other Internet connected products.

I dare you to purchase a Yamaha amplifier with an ethernet interface,
connect it to a good set of speakers within range to make it loud in
your bedroom and provide me with your timezone and the IP address
of the Yamaha in its default configuration.

You can call it FUD all you want, but the average ethernet-connected
printer is quite vulnerable. So are many of the smart media devices
floating around out there. 

Same with many of the network-connected thermostats I have experimented
with.

For anyone who knows enough to understand the risk they are or are not
taking by opening things up, it’s trivial to program in the desired
exceptions or turn off the default deny.

For everyone else, we should protect the internet from letting them
shoot themselves in the head in such a way that we get hit with the
back splatter.

> The thing you need from all manufactures is a commitment to release
> fixes (no necessarially feature upgrades) for the devices they ship
> for the real life the product and for users to upgrade the products.

Certainly that helps, but it’s a fantasy in too many cases to act like
it is a foregone conclusion or fait accompli.

> Software doesn't wear out.  Bugs just get found and design flaws
> discovered.  The existing warranty policies are designed around
> products that physically wear out.

Sure, but until that is actually changed, a default permit policy on a
home gateway remains one of the worst ideas I can imagine.

Owen