TWC (AS11351) blocking all NTP?
Dobbins, Roland
rdobbins at arbor.net
Mon Feb 3 07:08:25 UTC 2014
On Feb 3, 2014, at 1:54 PM, Michael DeMan <nanog at deman.com> wrote:
> I certainly would not want to provide as part the AUP (as seller or buyer), a policy that fundamentals like NTP are 'blocked' to customers. Seems like too much of a slippery slope for my taste.
The idea is to block traffic to misconfigured ntpds on broadband customer access networks, not to limit their choice of which ntp servers to use.
> In regards to anti-spoofing measures - I think there a couple of vectors about the latest NTP attack where more rigorous client-side anti-spoofing could help but will not solve it overall.
Rigorous antispoofing would solve the problem of all reflection/amplification DDoS attacks. My hunch is that most spoofed traffic involved in these attacks actually emanates from compromised/abused servers on IDC networks (including so-called 'bulletproof' miscreant-friendly networks), but I've no data to support that, yet.
> Trying to be fair and practical (from my perspective) - it is a lot easier and quicker to patch/workaround IPv4 problems and address proper solutions via IPv6 and associated RFCs?
There's nothing in IPv6 which makes any difference. The ultimate solution is antispoofing at the customer edge.
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Roland Dobbins <rdobbins at arbor.net> // <http://www.arbornetworks.com>
Luck is the residue of opportunity and design.
-- John Milton
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